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RECENT DECISION
EXTENDED BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT - UNITED STATES v. BILIR
In United States v. Bilir' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a warrantless search and seizure based on
reasonable suspicion conducted by a customs officer away from a United
States border after nearly continuous surveillance of suspected smugglers
was justifiable under the "extended border search" doctrine embodied in the
statute authorizing customs officials' searches 2 for contraband material. 3 In
doing so, it concluded that the extended border search doctrine had not been
abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States4 and thus that such a search was constitutional. 5
The events that led to the arrest and conviction of the defendants in
Bilir began in 1977, when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials
received information that two seamen aboard a Turkish ship, the General
A.F. Cebesoy (Cebesoy), scheduled to call at several American ports, were
carrying a large quantity of heroin.6 It was reported that the two seamen,
one of them the defendant Bilir, would deliver the heroin to two or more
persons of Greek or Turkish origin in the United States.7 The ship was
placed under surveillance by DEA agents and customs officers in Savannah,
Georgia, its first United States port of call.8 There surveillance of two men
suspected of being the recipients of the drugs began,' and continued
intermittently from Savannah to Florida, Texas, and Louisiana, as the
suspects and the federal agents followed the Cebesoy's itinerary.10 Surveil-
1. 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979).
2. The statute authorizes searches of baggage "wherever found," in which a
customs officer has "reasonable cause to suspect" there is contraband and seizures of
merchandise found that an officer has "reasonable cause to believe" was imported
into the United States illegally. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1978). See note 21 infra.
3. 592 F.2d at 741.
4. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
5. 592 F.2d at 742. In Almeida-Sanchez the Court held that because a
warrantless search conducted by a roving patrol of immigration officers did not take
place at a border or its functional equivalent, it could only be conducted with consent
or if based upon probable cause. 413 U.S. at 272-73. See text accompanying notes 41
to 47 infra.
6. 592 F.2d at 737.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In Savannah, the agents observed two persons, one of them later identified as
defendant Akdeniz, enter the area of the ship and walk around. They did not board
the ship, leaving the port area after a brief period of time. They met Bilir on a number
of occasions in Savannah, under the surveillance of the agents. Id.
10. Id. The suspects were followed to Jacksonville and towards Texas, then from
Galveston to New Orleans and to northern Louisiana. Because of the agents'
difficulty keeping up with them, they were arrested, but released shortly thereafter, in
Louisiana. Id.
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lance of the two suspects was discontinued, and the agents regained contact
with the ship in Baltimore, its last American port of call.'1 At the Baltimore
docks they observed the two suspected recipients of the drugs board and
subsequently leave the ship. 2 While aboard the ship one of the suspects
changed his attire to a style frequently used by smugglers to "body-carry"
drugs. 13 Thereafter, surveillance of the suspects was continuous except for
two periods. One suspect entered a bar, in which he remained unobserved for
two or three minutes, and two were out of view during a five-hour period in
which they were inside their hotel room. 14
The next morning, two of the suspects checked out of their hotel room,' 5
both wearing jackets, and one carrying a suitcase, not seen before by DEA
agents, took a taxicab to the Pennsylvania Railroad Station, and purchased
tickets to New York City.' 6 The suspects separated, one of them having
recognized a DEA agent, but both were apprehended. A customs officer
questioned defendant Sokum, who was carrying the suitcase, opened the
suitcase, and found over thirteen pounds of what was identified as nearly
pure heroin.17
Bilir, Akdeniz, and Sokum were tried in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland' 8 and convicted of violating various federal
drug laws.' 9 They appealed to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the admission
of the heroin found in the search of the suitcase."
11. Id. Uniformed customs agents were stationed visibly in each of the ship's
intermediate ports of call, in an attempt to discourage delivery of the drugs before the
ship reached Baltimore. Id. at 737-38.
12. Id. at 738. Agents had seen Bilir leave the ship after it docked and meet
defendants Akdeniz, who had been one of the two men earlier following the ship, and
Sokum in Baltimore. The agents, unable to follow the three when they left in a
taxicab, returned to the ship, where they saw the suspects board. Id.
13. Id. He changed from a tight-fitting T-shirt to a long-sleeved loose shirt worn
outside his pants.
14. Id. The third suspect Bilir had returned to the Cebesoy the night before.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The customs officer asked for permission to search the suitcase and
received no response. When he asked for the key to the locked suitcase, Sokum gave it
to him. Id. So far as the facts of the case reveal, it was fortuitous that the questioning
of Sokum and search of the suitcase was conducted by a customs officer. DEA agents
and customs officers had been working together on the case since the first
surveillance of the Cebesoy in Savannah, id. at 737, and the second suspect,
defendant Akdeniz, was apprehended at the train station by a DEA agent, id. at 738.
Had the search of the suitcase been conducted by the DEA agent, it might well have
been held unconstitutional. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
18. United States v. Biliar, Crim. No. N-77-0340 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 1977). They
submitted to a joint bench trial on stipulated facts, subject only to exceptions to the
admission of certain evidence. 592 F.2d at 736. A fourth suspect, Kandemier, entered a
guilty plea and was not involved in the appeal.
19. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to import heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 963
(1972); possession of heroin with intent to distribute, id. § 952; and conspiracy to
distribute heroin, id. § 846. 592 F.2d at 736 & n.1.
20. The defendants also challenged the admission of information acquired
incident to the arrest of Akdeniz in Louisiana some time before the warrantless search
19791
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Two related issues faced the court of appeals: whether the search was
authorized by statute, and thus whether it satisfied the criteria of the
extended border search doctrine, 21 and whether the Supreme Court had
rejected that doctrine in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.2 2 Because of a
strong national interest in stopping illegal importations, 23 searches
conducted at the United States border are not subject to the usual fourth
amendment requirement that for a search to be reasonable there must be a
warrant based upon probable cause. 4 Border searches are considered
reasonable simply because they occur at a border. 25 Under the "extended
and statements made by Sokum to arresting officers after the search. Because the
court found such evidence merely cumulative of other evidence it had already
received, the circuit court concluded that this evidence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 592 F.2d at 739 n.5.
21. The federal statute authorizing searches by customs officers, 19 U.S.C. § 482
(1978), was said by the court to express the border search exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment. 592 F.2d at 739. Any customs
officer is authorized under that statute to:
stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts,
any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there
is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the
United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in
possession or charge, or by, in or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and
to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a
reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported
contrary to law; and if any such officer or other person so authorized shall
find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any
such trunk or envelope which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is
subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States,
whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle,
beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the same for trial.
19 U.S.C. § 482 (1978) (emphasis added). See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970) (similar
authority for immigration officials).
22. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See text accompanying notes 40 to 47 infra. Because the
court concluded that the search was justified as an extended border search, it did not
reach the government's alternate argument that the search was justified as one based
upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. 592 F.2d at 739 n.4.
23. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The purpose of a search by
customs officers is not to apprehend persons, but to seize contraband unlawfully
imported or brought into the United States. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379,
382 (9th Cir. 1966).
24. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376
(1971); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). The border search exception has been said to apply to
searches by customs officers, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977),
and by the Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
25. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). Even at a border, however,
the scope of the search and the manner in which it is carried out must meet a
reasonableness standard. See generally Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law
of Border Searches, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1974).
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border search" doctrine, courts have applied this rule to certain searches
conducted away from an actual border.16
In an opinion by Judge Phillips, the court of appeals initially explained
and defined the extended border search doctrine.17 Unlike searches at
regular customs stations literally "on the border," 28 those conducted at
26. E.g., United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978); Castillo-Garcia
v. United States, 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75
(4th Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the propriety of the
"extended border search" doctrine. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 615
n.11 (1977). Because the Mexican-American border is within their jurisdictions, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have been by far the most influential in developing the
doctrine.
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that where the search is removed from the border,
the customs investigator must have a reasonable suspicion that the object of the
search has crossed the border or has been in contact with those who have done so.
E.g., United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978). Unless the object of the
search has an overall "nexus" with the border, the suspicion of the customs
investigator will not be upheld as reasonable. See United States v. Flores, 531 F.2d
222 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 976 (1977). In determining whether the object
of the search has a nexus with the border, the Fifth Circuit has considered such
factors as the time that has elapsed since the border crossing and the distance from
the border, United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 931 (1974); the extent of surveillance of the suspects subsequent to the border
crossing, United States v. Martinez, 577 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 914
(1978); the behavior of the suspects at the border itself, United States v. Maya, 549
F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1977); and the behavior of the suspects after the border crossing,
United States v. Flores, 531 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Ninth Circuit has determined that in cases in which the border search is
not made at the actual border, the customs officer must be reasonably certain that
any contraband which might be found has in fact crossed the border. E.g., United
States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971);
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 977
(1966). As in the Fifth Circuit, the legality of the search is tested by the surrounding
circumstances, including the time and distance that has elapsed since the border
crossing as well as the manner and extent of surveillance. See id. at 382. It is no
longer required that the vehicle or person to be searched has actually crossed the
border, so long as the customs officer is reasonably certain that an object smuggled
across the border will be discovered. See United States v. Vigil, 448 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1971). Constant surveillance is not necessary, United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370
(9th Cir. 1975), nor must the actual border crossing of the contraband be observed,
United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1335 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947
(1971). However, where the amount of contraband is small, even a very brief lapse in
surveillance may prevent the customs officer from having the requisite reasonable
certainty. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 910 (1976).
27. Finding only one applicable Fourth Circuit case, United States v. McGlone,
394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968), the court looked to other circuits for guidance.
28. Searches at the borders are reasonable per se under the fourth amendment,
and the controlling standards are statutory and not constitutional. See United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977). Despite the statute's assertion of an authority
to conduct a search "wherever [certain items may be] found," the Bilir court posited
that this authority is "assuredly subject to ultimate constitutional constraints." 592
F.2d at 739 n.6 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 615 n.ll (1977)).
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points physically away from an actual border and removed in time from the
precise moment of importation are not reasonable per se: "The test of
validity is one of reasonableness under the circumstances."2 9 Customs
officials must have a reasonable basis for the suspicion that the material
seized is dutiable or contraband 3° and that it has illegally crossed a border
within a reasonably recent time. 31
The court noted that it was examining a "deliberately delayed search,"
one intentionally conducted away from the actual border after officers had
observed a border crossing by known suspects.32 The most important factor
in assessing the reasonableness of a delayed search is the extent to which
continuous surveillance of the suspects has been maintained from the border
crossing to the location of the search.33 Continuous surveillance, the court
reasoned, assures that the customs search will not be employed against
persons or objects that have never been the legitimate targets of a border
search.34 Two less relevant factors, the time that has elapsed since the
border crossing and the distance from the actual border, must also be
considered. 35
Applying these criteria to the case before it, the court concluded that the
search at the Pennsylvania Railroad Station was reasonable, and thus
constitutionally permissible under the fourth amendment. First, it noted
that the time that had elapsed since the border crossing - seven hours -
and the distance from the border - three to four miles - were both well
within acceptable extended border search limits.3 6 More importantly, the
court found the customs officer's suspicion that the suitcase might contain
heroin, and that if so it had recently crossed the border at the Baltimore
docks, was reasonable under the circumstances. The officer knew of the
month-long pursuit of both the ship and the suspects and the corroborating
29. 592 F.2d at 740.
30. Id. at 740 & n.7.
31. Id. at 740. The majority employed a standard similar to that presently used in
the Fifth Circuit. See note 26 supra. Cf. United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1970) (requiring reasonable certainty that contraband crossed the border), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971).
32. 592 F.2d at 740-41. See United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir.
1978). The court recognized another type of extended border search, one in which the
first contact with the suspect and the first opportunity to search occur away from the
actual border. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 483 F.2d 203 (3rd Cir. 1973) (suspect
observed leaving border area; search after short chase), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132
(1974); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968) (suspects first
encountered in parking lot near dock area).
33. 592 F.2d at 741.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978)(constitutional search 254 miles and 20 hours from observed border crossing); United
States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1973) (search 150 miles and 142 hours from
observed border crossing)).
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information acquired in the course of that pursuit.37 The court also was
persuaded by the virtually continuous surveillance from ship to railroad
station and found it provided assurance that if contraband were to be
disclosed by the search, it had indeed been in the defendants' possession
when they came across the border from the ship seven hours earlier.3"
The court rejected the contention that the Supreme Court had directly or
indirectly disapproved of the extended border search doctrine in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States.39 The Bilir defendants had argued that by failing
to include "extended border searches" along with those "at the border itself'
and "at its functional equivalents" in describing permissible warrantless
searches, the Court had rejected the extended border search exception.40
In Almeida-Sanchez the Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile, based upon neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion,
conducted by a roving patrol of immigration officers twenty-five air miles
north of the Mexican-American border violated the fourth amendment.41
Finding the search could not be justified as an automobile or an
administrative search,4 2 the Court considered whether a statute, together
with implementing regulations, authorizing warrantless searches by
immigration officials of automobiles within 100 air miles of a United States
37. Id. This information included the predicted contact between the seaman and
the suspects of Turkish extraction on the mainland, and the convergence on
Baltimore by all the suspects. The officers' developing suspicion was confirmed by the
suspects' behavior at the railroad station immediately prior to the search: the
purchase of tickets for New York, the sudden attempt to flee upon recognition of the
DEA agents, and the false answers given by one of the suspects. Id.
38. The degree of continuity in the surveillance was questioned by Judge Winter
in his dissent. See notes 55 to 59 and accompanying text infra.
39. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
40. 592 F.2d at 741.
41. 413 U.S. at 273. Almeida-Sanchez was convicted of receiving and transporting
marijuana, which was found when the border patrol stopped and searched his
automobile in a check for illegal aliens. Id. The United States Border Patrol conducts
several types of surveillance along inland roadways, all in the asserted interest of
detecting illegal importation of aliens: the maintenance of permanent checkpoints at
certain intersections, temporary checkpoints at others, and the use of roving patrols
such as the one in Almeida-Sanchez. Id. at 268.
Although Almeida-Sanchez involved a search by immigration officers, courts
have found it applicable to searches by customs officers as well. E.g., United States v.
Gallagher, 557 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1978); United
States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976). Many of the customs searches
conducted near the Mexican-American border begin as searches by immigration
officials looking for illegal aliens. The immigration officers are entitled to assume a
role as customs agents once a search discloses incriminating evidence which indicates
violations of the customs laws. See generally Note, Extended Border Searches by
Immigration Officers, 31 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 143 (1974).
42. 413 U.S. at 269-72.
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boundary was constitutional.3 It recognized the power to exclude aliens and
to conduct border searches in order to do so,44 but concluded that whatever
the permissible scope of searches occurring at a border or its "functional
equivalent," 45 the search in question violated the fourth amendment. 4s Such
a search must be made with consent or supported by probable cause.
47
Almeida-Sanchez seems to have had only a limited effect on the
"extended border search" doctrine. Although most of the Ninth Circuit
decisions have employed its "functional equivalent" of the border language,
the courts have nevertheless not significantly altered the established
extended border search doctrine.4s The status of the doctrine in the Fifth
Circuit is less clear. Although the Fifth Circuit's pre-Almeida-Sanchez
standard 49 continues to be applied,-, it has been rejected by one panel in
light of Almeida-Sanchez.5'
43. Section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act authorized such
searches within a reasonable distance of the border, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970), as
authorized in regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. The regulations
define "reasonable distance" as within 100 air miles of an external boundary of the
United States. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1978). The Court gave special consideration to the fact
that the search was authorized by statute because of its "duty to construe the statute,
if possible, in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment." 413 U.S. at 272.
44. 413 U.S. at 272.
45. Id. at 273. The Court offered two examples of "functional equivalents":
[S]earches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be
functional equivalents of border searches .... [A] search of the passengers
and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a non-stop flight
from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border
search.
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Almeida-Sanchez has been applied to a search of an automobile at a fixed
checkpoint removed from the border or its functional equivalent, United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), but has been distinguished in cases involving less intrusion
on fourth amendment rights, such as routine stops for questioning by roving patrols,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (specific articulable facts that
reasonably warranted suspicion vehicle contained illegal aliens necessary), and at
fixed checkpoints, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 1116 (1976) (no
individualized suspicion necessary at reasonably located checkpoints, referral to
secondary inspection area may be based on grounds less than required for roving
patrol stops).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976). For the
application of the doctrine in the Ninth Circuit, see note 26 supra.
49. See note 26 supra.
50. E.g., United States v. Whitmore, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Beck, 484 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132 (1974).
51. In United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979), in finding a search
conducted well after a border crossing unconstitutional, a panel of the Fifth Circuit
rejected the pre-Almeida-Sanchez standard of "reasonable suspicion" and "nexus with
the border," see note 26 supra, as "overly broad by Almeida-Sanchez standards." 588
F.2d at 154. It held that a search would not be a valid border search "unless it appears
by a preponderance of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that a border crossing
[VOL. 39
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The Bilir court distinguished Almeida-Sanchez.52 The roving border
search examined in that case would not have qualified as an extended
border search by immigration or customs officers: the officers who
conducted it did not have a reasonable suspicion that material recently
illegally imported would be disclosed by the search. 53 The Bilir court
concluded that Almeida-Sanchez had not "directly or by necessary
implication" abrogated the extended border search doctrine.54
Judge Winter dissented, reading Almeida-Sanchez to establish that "in
the interest of national protection, warrantless searches may be conducted
only at the border or at its functional equivalent. ' 55 Because the search did
not occur at an actual border, its validity depended upon the characteriza-
tion of the site of the search as the functional equivalent of a border. The
location of a search can be considered the functional equivalent of a border
only if the factors that make the border search reasonable are present: a
certainty that the objects of the search have come from outside the country
and a diminished expectation of privacy because of the regularity of the
inspection procedure. 56 Judge Winter concluded that these factors were not
present. Because there were significant gaps in surveillance subsequent to
the actual border crossing, it was not reasonable to assume that the
defendants were carrying goods that had quite recently crossed the border at
the Baltimore docks. 57 Moreover, the search was removed both in time and
has occurred." Id. (footnotes omitted). The court criticized two other post-Almeida-
Sanchez decisions in the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Brom, 542 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.
1976), and United States v. Flores, 531 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 976
(1976), that had continued to apply the old standard:
With all due respect to the panels that decided those cases, we do not see how
they can be squared with Almeida-Sanchez and the other Supreme Court
border search cases discussed in this opinion. Both cases involved searches
conducted well after Almeida-Sanchez was decided, yet neither even mentions,
let alone discusses, that case. Both were decided entirely on the basis of pre-
Almeida-Sanchez case law. We can see no principled way to distinguish these
cases from the one before us, but we have an overriding obligation to follow
Supreme Court precedent.
588 F.2d at 156 (footnote omitted)..
52. 592 F.2d at 742. The court assumed Almeida-Sanchez applied to searches by
customs officials as well as immigration officers. See note 41 supra.
53. 592 F.2d at 742.
54. Id. at 742 (citing United States v. Beck, 483 F.2d 203, 208 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1132 (1974); United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 339 n.4 (5th Cir.
1978) (Brown, C.J., concurring)).
55. Id.
56. Id. These factors were employed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 716-19 (5th Cir. 1976).
57. 592 F.2d at 743. Judge Winter's primary disagreement with the majority was
based on its characterization of the surveillance as "practically continuous." Id. at
741. After analyzing the facts, he pointed to three "breaks" in the chain of
surveillance. See id. at 743. Because of these breaks, Judge Winter believed that while
the agents may have had a strong suspicion that the defendants were transporting
goods that had been recently carried across the border in Baltimore, there were not
grounds for a reasonable belief that this was true. Judge Winter's standard of belief
1979]
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in distance from the actual border crossing, and thus did not occur under
circumstances comparable to a customary border search where the entrant
has a diminished or nonexistent expectation of privacy.58 Even if Almeida-
Sanchez were not to be applied, Judge Winter contended, the majority's
standard was not satisfied by the facts of the case. Due to the breaks in
surveillance, he concluded that the agents' belief that the goods seized had
recently come from outside the country was not reasonable.5 9
Bilir does not satisfactorily resolve the issue of what effect Almeida-
Sanchez has on the extended border search doctrine. Although the court
concluded that the Supreme Court had not completely rejected the doctrine
in Almeida-Sanchez, it did not determine to what extent the doctrine had
been altered by that case. 6° The case's major significance is that it
establishes an analytical structure for the application of the extended border
search doctrine in the Fourth Circuit.
The Bilir court recognized that there are two fact patterns in which the
extended border search doctrine may be applied; the categorization of a case
as involving one of these two fact patterns determines the factors to be
applied in testing the constitutionality of a search. The first fact pattern is
one involving a so-called "deliberately delayed" search, as in the Bilir case
itself.61 The second is a case in which the first contact with the suspect and
the first opportunity to search occur away from the border. 62 The court
cited United States v. McGlone,63 an earlier Fourth Circuit decision, as an
example of a case involving the second fact pattern.
was the same as that required by the Ninth Circuit in the extended border search
context: the customs investigator must be reasonably certain that contraband is
entering the United States. See note 26 supra. District Judge Northrop also used this
standard in his opinion in the Bilir case. United States v. Biliar, Crim. No. N-77-0340
(D. Md. Aug. 21, 1977), slip op. at 4. Although it affirmed the lower court, the Bilir
majority used a different standard. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra. See
also United States v. Diaz-Segovia, 457 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1978).
58. 592 F.2d at 744.
59. Id.
60. Compare Bilir with United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979),
discussed in note 51 supra.
61. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 32 supra.
63. 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968). The Fourth Circuit has been faced with only one
other extended border search case which even remotely touched upon the problem
presented in Bilir. In United States v. Gallagher, 557 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1978), the defendant was convicted for importing drugs in a
vehicle shipped from Portugal to Norfolk, Virginia. The vehicle entered the United
States at Baltimore, but was not searched until its arrival several days later at
Norfolk, the final destination. Defendant maintained that the search violated the
fourth amendment. The Gallagher court concluded that the camper, although
physically within the territorial confines of the United States, never left the official
custody of the customs officers. Thus, when the camper arrived at Norfolk, it
remained at "the border" for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. The court did
not grapple with defining the Almeida-Sanchez concept of "functional equivalent of
the border."
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In McGlone, the court tested the validity of a search conducted at the
parking lot of a Baltimore dock. While aboard a ship discharging cargo from
Japan a customs inspector discovered that 600 radios, upon which duty had
not yet been paid, were missing. A customs investigator at the Baltimore
dock was notified of the missing radios. He stopped the defendants,
longshoremen who were leaving the dock's adjacent parking area in their
automobiles, and conducted a warrantless search of each automobile. The
defendants were convicted of theft, and appealed.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that no rigid formula for testing the
reasonableness of a search could be prescribed.64 Rather, the validity of a
search depends upon whether all the facts establish reasonable cause to
suspect that merchandise is presently being illegally introduced into the
United States by the person the officer proposes to search.65 The
determination of reasonableness depends upon the distance of the search
from the point where goods could be introduced by the suspects into the
United States, the time that has elapsed since the suspects had an
opportunity to bring in the goods, and the circumstances upon which the
searching officers based their suspicions.66 The search in question was
performed immediately after the discovery of the missing goods and before
the longshoremen left the area. Moreover, the search was confined to the
enclosed, guarded parking area adjacent to the pier. Finally, the investiga-
tor's suspicion was based upon both his knowledge that the goods were
missing and his prior experience with longshoremen. The court concluded
that the factors of time, place, and opportunity for smuggling, together with
the facts known to the investigators, provided reasonable cause to suspect
that the defendants were introducing dutiable goods into the United States
without the payment of customs duty, and affirmed the convictions. 67
Although the circumstances in Bilir were quite different than those in
McGlone, the Bilir court did not change the underlying concepts that were
applied in the earlier decision. In both opinions the court concluded that
before conducting a warrantless search, the customs officer must have a
reasonable suspicion that materials are illegally being introduced into the
United States. 68 As in McGlone, the Bilir court isolated time, distance, and
surrounding circumstances as factors that must be considered in determin-
ing the reasonableness of an extended border search. In Bilir, however, the
significance of these factors was minimized and a new factor stressed.
Because it was examining a "deliberately delayed" search, the court found
continuity of surveillance of the suspects to be the single most important
64. 394 F.2d at 78.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79. See United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) (warrantless
search valid under similar circumstances), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
68. See 592 F.2d at 740; 394 F.2d at 78.
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factor in assessing the reasonableness of the search. The difference in
emphasis between McGlone and Bilir may be explained by distinguishing
the fact patterns of the two cases. In the McGlone situation, the first contact
with a suspect, hence the first opportunity to search, occurs away from the
actual border.6 9 The suspicion that the defendant possesses material that
has recently crossed a border will ordinarily be wholly circumstantial, 7° and
the time and distance factors, therefore, may be quite crucial in assessing
reasonableness of suspicion.71 A search in the Bilir situation is conducted
away from the border by design. The delay occurs either to bolster by further
observation of the suspects' activities a suspicion that is arguably marginal
at the time of the border crossing, or to allow the apprehension of
accomplices inland of the border. 72 Because in these cases the reasonable-
ness of the search depends upon the assurance that the object of the search
crossed the border, the most important factor is the extent to which
surveillance has been maintained from the border crossing to the location of
the search.
It is this very difference in fact patterns between McGlone and Bilir that
may be the dividing line between warrantless searches away from a border
that are constitutional and those that are not. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,73 the Supreme Court stated that warrantless searches may be
conducted at the border and at its "functional equivalents. ' ' 74 However, the
term "functional equivalent" remains undefined. There are two possible
interpretations: that a particular place removed from the border may be the
functional equivalent of the border;75 and that a particular search may be
the functional equivalent of a search at the border.76 The two examples of
functional equivalents to border searches given in Almeida-Sanchez,7 7 a
search at an established station near the border at the junction of two or
more roads leading from the border and one at the destination of a non-stop
69. See 592 F.2d at 740 n.8.
70. Id. at 740.
71. Id. See also United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
72. See 592 F.2d at 740 n.9 (citing examples of each type of case). Although the
Bilir court expressed no opinion regarding the issue, it noted that some judicial
concern has been expressed as to the constitutionality of a delayed search where the
suspicion is sufficiently strong to justify a search at the actual border, but it is
nevertheless delayed in order to apprehend accomplices. Id. See United States v.
Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 350-52 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., dissenting); United States
v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (5th Cir.), vacated on the extended border search
point, 538 F.2d 1230, 1234 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
73. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
74. Id. at 273.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Reyma, 572 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978). This
dichotomy was suggested in United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147, 154 (5th Cir.
1979). See note 51 supra.
77. See note 45 supra.
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flight from Mexico City, seem to support the place theory. Each can be
described as occurring at a location at which it is first possible or practical
to search after the United States border has been crossed.
78
If the term is limited to the first interpretation - that "functional
equivalent" includes only locations - then the type of search conducted in
McGlone will be constitutional, while that in Bilir will not. This interpreta-
tion means, ostensibly, that customs searches must take place at specified
sites, where an entrant has no reasonable expectation of privacy and where
it is certain that the objects of the searches have come from outside the
country. 79 The search in McGlone took place at such a site, an enclosed,
guarded area adjacent to a port-of-entry to the United States.8° The search in
Bilir, however, occurred at the Pennsylvania Railroad Station, a location
having no international connections.
If, however, the second interpretation is accepted - that a search away
from the border can be the functional equivalent of a border search - the
types of searches in both McGlone and Bilir are permissible under the fourth
amendment. Under this interpretation, regardless of where a search takes
place, it will be constitutional so long as the facts and circumstances assure
that fourth amendment guarantees have been preserved. It is only this
second interpretation that permits the extended border search doctrine as
applied in Bilir to continue.
The question that was not fully answered in Bilir is how the Supreme
Court's "functional equivalent" language affects the extended border search
doctrine. Given the different approaches taken by the circuits,81 the time
may be ripe for the Court to provide guidance as to the propriety of that
doctrine.
78. Other cases in which searches have been found by the Court not to occur at
the functional equivalent of the border also support the place theory. United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 1116 (1976) (checkpoint 62 air miles north of border); United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (same); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975) (roving patrol stop near same).
79. Examples would be international airports and seaports. See United States v.
Brennan, 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976).
80. See text accompanying notes 63 to 67 supra.
81. See note 26 supra.
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